So, here is part 2 (see last Wednesday's post for part 1).
Here is my list of half a dozen things not to negotiate (much) over:
(1) Voting Rights. Here is a mistake the VCs made a few times way back in the dawn of time, and now they don’t make the mistake any more. Under Delaware law, unless your certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, you need the vote of the holders of common stock, voting separately as a class, to increase the authorized stock of the company. Without this provision, the common have veto rights over all sorts of things, including additional financing. Here is the provision:
The Company’s Certificate of Incorporation will provide that the number of authorized shares of Common Stock may be increased or decreased with the approval of a majority of the Preferred and Common Stock, voting together as a single class, and without a separate class vote by the Common Stock, irrespective of the provisions of Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Ignore and move on.
(2) Protective Provisions. I admit there are some nuances in here that merit negotiation (which is why this might have been item 6 (or 7) of terms to negotiate), but the basic principle that there are some things for which the company will need the consent of the series A stockholders voting as a class by themselves is not assailable. Here is the NVCA list:
(i) liquidate, dissolve or wind up the business and affairs of the Company, or effect any Deemed Liquidation Event or consent to any of the foregoing; (ii) amend, alter, or repeal any provision of the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws [in a manner adverse to the Series A Preferred]; (iii) create or authorize the creation of [or issue or obligate itself to issue shares of,] any other security convertible into or exercisable for any equity security, having rights, preferences or privileges senior to or on parity with the Series A Preferred, or increase the authorized number of shares of Series A Preferred or of any additional class or series of capital stock [unless it ranks junior to the Series A Preferred]; (iv) reclassify, alter or amend any existing security that is junior to or on parity with the Series A Preferred, if such reclassification, alteration or amendment would render such other security senior to or on parity with the Series A Preferred; (v) purchase or redeem or pay any dividend on any capital stock prior to the Series A Preferred, [other than stock repurchased from former employees or consultants in connection with the cessation of their employment/services, at the lower of fair market value or cost;] [other than as approved by the Board, including the approval of [_____] Series A Director(s)]; (vi) create or authorize the creation of any debt security [if the Company’s aggregate indebtedness would exceed $[____][other than equipment leases or bank lines of credit]unless such debt security has received the prior approval of the Board of Directors, including the approval of [________] Series A Director(s)]; (vii) create or hold capital stock in any subsidiary that is not a wholly-owned subsidiary or dispose of any subsidiary stock or all or substantially all of any subsidiary assets[; or (viii) increase or decrease the size of the Board of Directors].
One thing that people sometimes like to talk about is how many shares of Series A have to be outstanding for the class to have these rights. As a general proposition, the Series A is not going to convert a bunch and leave a bunch just to keep these rights. Pick a number that is sizable enough to discourage gamesmanship and move on.
The nuances that I refer to above are in the bracketed language. Some of these bracketed alternatives could end up having some relevance to you. For example, there are businesses that are looking to get equipment leasing or lines of credit. The notion of being able to do things with the approval of the Series A appointed directors is some modest help. Despite the fact that Delaware law is moving in the direction of making it clearer and clearer that directors owe a duty to the holders of common stock and not preferred stock, there is enough gray zone so that, except in some pretty odd cases, the directors are going to be able to rationalize doing what is in the interest of the Series A holders. Still, in all, it is worth going for that.
One more word of caution. If the list has more stuff on it than the NVCA list, try to negotiate down to the NVCA list.
(3) Antidilution. Broad based weighed average antidilution is the accepted standard. According to our research it appears in close to all series A deals. This provision for which it is somewhat hard to find a clear intellectual argument, protects investors (a little) against future issuances of securities at prices lower than those paid by the investors. There are some alternatives. I mentioned full ratchet in the intro. If you see full ratchet, consider running screaming from the room. If you see “fully” broad based, it is good for you. But, you are not likely to see it. Sometimes (rarely) you may get no price based antidilution protection (even better for you). If you want to get into this topic more, here is a link. If you clicked on that link, you probably have too much time on your hands.
For the sake of stylistic consistency, here is the NVCA antidilution formula:
“Typical” weighted average:
CP2 = CP1 * (A+B) / (A+C)
CP2 = Series A Conversion Price in effect immediately after new issue
CP1 = Series A Conversion Price in effect immediately prior to new issue
A = Number of shares of Common Stock deemed to be outstanding immediately prior to new issue (includes all shares of outstanding common stock, all shares of outstanding preferred stock on an as-converted basis, and all outstanding options on an as-exercised basis; and does not include any convertible securities converting into this round of financing)
B = Aggregate consideration received by the Corporation with respect to the new issue divided by CP1
C = Number of shares of stock issued in the subject transaction
As is the case with all else, there are nuances. In this case, here are some exceptions to the issuances that trigger the antidilution protection for the series A holders. Here is the NVCA list of exceptions:
(i) securities issuable upon conversion of any of the Series A Preferred, or as a dividend or distribution on the Series A Preferred; (ii) securities issued upon the conversion of any debenture, warrant, option, or other convertible security; (iii) Common Stock issuable upon a stock split, stock dividend, or any subdivision of shares of Common Stock; and (iv) shares of Common Stock (or options to purchase such shares of Common Stock) issued or issuable to employees or directors of, or consultants to, the Company pursuant to any plan approved by the Company’s Board of Directors [including at least [_______] Series A Director(s)] [(v) shares of Common Stock issued or issuable to banks, equipment lessors or other financial institutions, or to real property lessors, pursuant to a debt financing, equipment leasing or real property leasing transaction approved by the Board of Directors of the Corporation [, including at least [_______] Series A Director(s)]
You need these exceptions, and it is worth spending a few minutes making sure you have them and trying for the max in flexibility. If you don’t have substantially all of these exceptions, there is something wrong, and you do need to raise the issue.
(4) Registration Rights. These come into play after you have gone public. You should be so lucky. If you have had your IPO and there is a nice market for your stock and some benighted VC is bugging you about registering some sale of her stock while you are busy swilling martinis on your yacht, you can tell Jeeves to give her the run around. Don’t waste your breath arguing about reg rights now.
(5) Management Information Rights Letter. VCs need this to meet the tax requirements for Venture Capital Operating Companies (the so-called VCOC rules). Your lawyer should make sure the agreement is in fact standard and does not overreach. Beyond that, go back to sleep. But, I hasten to add, if you are dealing with an investor who is not a VCOC, you can, and should, get rid of this nasty little agreement.
(6) No-Shop. Your investor will want a period of exclusive dealing during which she can negotiate and close. I see a lot of 45 day periods, but 60 is OK too. My advice: go with the flow.
Well, I am at 4000 words (spread across two posts) and I have skipped over a bunch of stuff in the typical term sheet including such gems as the redemption rights provision. The one I feel badly about is things requiring investor director approval. So, here, by special mention, is the NVCA list of things requiring investor director approval. These are things that a company cannot do unless the board approves and that approval includes the affirmative vote of the series A appointed directors (or at least one of them). As noted with respect to other things above, you would like to keep this list to a minimum. But, you are not going to be able to make it go away. My comment about the duties of directors under Delaware law applies here, but don’t expect these directors to act against the interest of the series A.
(i) make any loan or advance to, or own any stock or other securities of, any subsidiary or other corporation, partnership, or other entity unless it is wholly owned by the Company; (ii) make any loan or advance to any person, including, any employee or director, except advances and similar expenditures in the ordinary course of business or under the terms of a employee stock or option plan approved by the Board of Directors; (iii) guarantee any indebtedness except for trade accounts of the Company or any subsidiary arising in the ordinary course of business; (iv) make any investment inconsistent with any investment policy approved by the Board; (v) incur any aggregate indebtedness in excess of $[_____] that is not already included in a Board-approved budget, other than trade credit incurred in the ordinary course of business; (vi) enter into or be a party to any transaction with any director, officer or employee of the Company or any “associate” (as defined in Rule 12b-2 promulgated under the Exchange Act) of any such person [except transactions resulting in payments to or by the Company in an amount less than $[60,000] per year], [or transactions made in the ordinary course of business and pursuant to reasonable requirements of the Company’s business and upon fair and reasonable terms that are approved by a majority of the Board of Directors]; (vii) hire, fire, or change the compensation of the executive officers, including approving any option grants; (viii) change the principal business of the Company, enter new lines of business, or exit the current line of business; (ix) sell, assign, license, pledge or encumber material technology or intellectual property, other than licenses granted in the ordinary course of business; or (x) enter into any corporate strategic relationship involving the payment contribution or assignment by the Company or to the Company of assets greater than [$100,000.00].
There is lots that can be said about term sheet provisions not discussed above. There are lots more resources on the web (and elsewhere) including our web site here at Foley Hoag's Emerging Enterprise Center to help you with term sheets. Keep in mind that in the end you want to (a) close the deal and (b) establish a good working relationship with your investor. Be sensitive to her needs and she will be sensitive to yours. Argue the points that count and settle when you have gotten what you can get. Strive to be tough but realistic and fair, and hope the other side strives for the same.