Lawyers: The Complaints Abound

Here is an excellent post on the trouble with lawyers by Steve Blank.  I wonder how much of the frustration reflects a real lack of competence on the part of the lawyer and how much reflects the natural urge of the entrepreneur to charge forward?

I understand the natural impatience of clients with lawyers, who in the natural course of their activities slow things down.  Having said that, sometimes there is value in that pain in the ass advice.  I admit, sometimes there isn't.

Is the Venture Economy Back or Do We Just Think So?

Everyone thinks things in the venture world are looking up. Numbers of deals are up, valuations are up, terms are friendly. VCs and entrepreneurs are lining Winter Street and Sand Hill Road holding hands and signing kumbaya. Well, not quite. Foley Hoag LLP, Fenwick &West LLP, and Cooley LLP have now all published their reviews of venture financing transactions for Q1 of 2010, and, while there are some interesting differences, the tone is generally upbeat. Having said that, perspective is everything and sweeping statements about the health of the venture economy are l likely to be wrong if you don’t take all the available facts into consideration.

Reports from these firms cover a lot of the same types of material however they each look at some different things and they each source the data in different ways.

Foley Hoag, my firm, is headquartered in Boston. Our publication, Foley Hoag Venture Perspectives, is devoted to an analysis of financings for companies headquartered in New England. We try to cover all New England deals (that is we don’t limit our reporting to deals in which our firm is involved). We cover activity levels, valuations, and terms. In each case we break it up between Series A investments on the one hand and Series B and later stage investments on the other hand. We also report on activity and size of deals by industry.

Fenwick describes its report as “Trends in terms of venture financings in Silicon Valley.” This firm reports on venture financings for companies headquartered in Silicon Valley, and reports on financing rounds, price changes, and something they refer to as the Fenwick & West Venture Capital Barometer (you will have to look that one up for yourself). They also report on a variety of deal terms.

Cooley has this to say about its report, “This quarterly report provides data reflecting Cooley’s experience in venture capital financing terms and trends. Information is taken from transactions in which Cooley served as counsel to either the issuing company or investors.” This firm reports on numbers of deals, valuations and certain terms. Cooley has nine offices, so their data comes from many regions but, as noted, is limited to deals in which they were involved.

Because we cover similar data (but not the same data) in different ways and present it in different ways, it just isn’t possible to compare the data from all firms on an apple to apples basis. So, I have focused this post on (1) activity levels (that is numbers of deals) and (2) deal terms. 

Activity Levels

All three firms are reporting increased activity in Q1 of 2010 over Q1 of 2009 and over Q4 of 2009.

Foley Hoag found that activity levels for Series A investments in New England measured by the number of deals was up both compared to Q4 of 2009 and Q1 of 2009. The picture was mixed for Series B and later stage investments. The number of these deals was down from last quarter but up from a year ago. It seems to me that variability is too great from quarter to quarter, so the year on year comparison seems to me to be more telling of the general direction of the venture economy.

Fenwick had this to say about the results they found, “1Q10 results were similar to 4Q09, with up rounds exceeding down rounds in 1Q10 49% to 32%, with 19% of rounds flat.” They also noted that according to their findings, internet/digital media had the best results while cleantech had the worst results.

Cooley had this to say about the deals they were involved in, “Though we saw a slight decline in deal numbers, we saw a significant increase in invested dollars compared to the same quarter a year ago. Additionally, up rounds reached a level we have not seen since the middle of 2008.”

In a big picture way, all three of us observed a modest but steady upward trend in the tech economy. 

Terms

The upward trend also appeared in the terms that companies are getting from their venture investors. I have tried to consolidate the deal terms reported on by the three of us in the table below. This table shows the percentage of deals having a particular term and compares the findings of each firm (to the extent that the firm covers the particular term) with respect to particular terms that appeared in deals closed during the first quarter of 2010.

 

Comparison of Terms for Q1 2010 Deals from Foley Hoag, Fenwick & West and Cooley

Term

Foley Hoag New England Series A

Foley Hoag New England Series B and Later

Fenwick Silicon Valley All Series

Cooley

Internal Series A

Cooley Internal Series B

Cooley Internal Series C

             

Cumulative Dividends

54%

69%

7%

X

X

X

Preference with Participation

46%

56%

48%

65%

45%

63%

Redemption

54%

64%

24%

X

X

X

Pay to Play

23%

28%

7%

6.30%

11.10%

11.10%

Weighted Average Antidilution

100%

94%

94%

 

84% all Series

 

Ratchet Antidilution

0%

3%

5%

 

16% all Series

 

Cumulative Dividends

The most striking comparison in this table is the fact that more than half of all New England deals carry cumulative dividends but less than 10% of Silicon Valley deals have them. That is huge difference. And, it is hard to explain. Many VC funds have offices in both markets. Based on that fact alone, I would have guessed that there would be a tendency to have some homogeneity within a fund and that this alone would cause differences to be much narrower than an order of magnitude. So, I checked out historical numbers going back a couple of years and this seems to be a persistent and consistent difference between New England and Silicon Valley. It certainly suggests that Silicon Valley is more founder friendly than New England, I am sorry to say.

Preferences with Participation

If the differences are striking when it comes to dividends, the similarities are striking when it comes to participation. Cooley’s numbers for Series A and Series C transactions seem to be higher than the norm, but this may well be due to peculiarities in the sample. This really begs the question why there is a seeming convergence around participation but not dividends. I don’t even have a good speculation around this one.

Redemption

With respect to redemption provisions, Foley Hoag is finding numbers that are twice as high as Fenwick (Cooley does not report on this term). This one, however, I think has an explanation. In New England the incidence of redemption provisions is trending downward rapidly. As I have said elsewhere, I suspect that this is in response to changes in accounting practices. The numbers probably reflect a more rapid response to these changes in Silicon Valley than New England, but I predict the will converge at a very low percentage over the next year or so.

Pay to Play

The incidence of pay to play provision is low across the board, but higher in New England than in Silicon Valley and higher than Cooley reports. My sense, entirely subjective, is that the difference is not particularly dramatic and probably reflects a slightly more conservative investment culture in New England than in Silicon Valley. I also predict that, as the venture industry works through the current very rough fund raising environment and more funds know where the stand with investment dollars, that the incidence of pay to play provisions will both decline to a lower number and converge across the country.

Antidilution

No surprises here. Weighted average antidilution is the universal standard. Full ratchet deals are rare everywhere, and, I believe, that they reflect unique circumstances.

Conclusion

While it is nice to be able to report an upward trend in our sector of the economy, it is not time for kumbaya yet. Let’s remember that it isn’t 2007 (which was a good, but not a great, year). We are staring at some chronic problems (trends like the retirement of the baby boomers and how is that going to be paid for and the staggering debt the U.S. and other countries have run up) and some acute problems (the debt crisis in Europe and the volatility of the stock markets). We are not going to dig our way out of this hole with a strong manufacturing comeback. We need a thriving entrepreneurial tech economy to lead the way. Fortunately, this sector looks like it may come back to life.

Be good to Mamma and Mamma (and Papa, uncle Bob and that rich aunt Sheila) will be good to you...

On the topic of friends and family financing and how best to structure those agreements, I know we have written about this before, but I think that a topic this nuanced warrants revisiting.

Ok, so you're entrepreneur Joe, and your dad, mom or that rich aunt, who has always spoiled you silly and thought you were God’s gift to this earth, wants to help you and your start-up, so they give you some money to help you get that start.

Pause…so you got some money from a relative/friend who wants to see you succeed. First question: did they give you the money or was it money for the company? If they wrote you a check (lucky you!) this blog will not apply to you. However, if there was an implicit or explicit understanding that they wanted to lend the company some money, then read on....

Continue Reading

Unforeseen Consequences

 At some point in time, every entrepreneur runs into some issue with their VC investors, I think.  Here is a link to a particularly unfortunate story by Steve Blank.  I am distressed to say that I am aware of several such situations.  Perhaps this will not be a surprise, but I don't believe that in any instance the VC is both aware of the entrepreneurs feelings and aware that the VC has contributed to the situation.  In most (all?) cases, it does not matter much to the VC because the VC has lots of venture he or she can back.  In one type of situation I believe it may matter. That is the case of the serial entrepreneur who has delivered a good exit.  There are precious few of these (and they don't win every time, but the way).  But, VCs like to back them, and they have the best odds.  If a VC has worked with a winner, and that winner wont come back to them, that may be a big failure with a potential financial consequence.

The numbers are here

Yesterday we (Foley Hoag) released our review of Q1 venture activity and deals in New England. Here is the link to Foley Hoag Venture Perspectives. As usual, the numbers are fascinating. A big downward trend in redemption provisions. Why? Perhaps accounting reasons. A topic for another post. Also, a noticeable trend favoring entrepreneurs. Why? Perhaps just the result of an overall improvement in the economy? Series A investments seem stronger than Series B and later. Why? Perhaps because all Series A investments are optimistic whereas at least some later stage deals are not? I will write more on this subject in the next few days.

Conflicts and Legal Representation

I hate losing clients, or potential clients, because of conflicts, or perceived conflicts. Unfortunately, this happens more often than I would like (which is never), and more often than I think is really necessary. 

There are many different types of conflicts. Some are harder to get over than others. As a general proposition, lawyers cannot represent one client in a matter that is adverse to another client. Litigation is a good example of this. For example, as a general proposition, a lawyer can’t sue a client on behalf of another client. 

 

Another example is that a lawyer cannot represent client 1, if her knowledge of something confidential about client 2 would materially impair her ability to represent client 1. One example of this arises in the patent context. If a lawyer is asked to prosecute a patent for client 1, say a medical device for spine surgery, and she has knowledge of research being done by client 2 that impinges upon the patent application because she has been helping client 2 with its patents in the area, there may be no way that she can represent client 1 in this patent.

 

The things I have been describing are true ethical conflicts, the kinds of things bar association rules generally prohibit without some sort of knowing waiver.

 

But, there are other conflicts, business conflicts, which arise more often and cause more problems. 

 

Here are two that arise all the time in the course of my practice: First, representing investors and companies. By this I mean generally, not both in the same transaction. Second, representing companies that are actual or potential competitors. 

 

By the way, if our firm represents someone, for legal and ethical purposes, it is the same as if I represented that person, even if another attorney in the firm was doing the work and I knew nothing about it.

 

So, back to the first conflict. I can’t tell you how often I find myself talking to a prospective client and the question comes up, “Do you represent venture capitalists?” The answer, of course, is “yes.” Then sometimes, the conversation goes this way, “isn’t that a conflict, if I want you to represent me in a financing?” 

 

Well, no, unless I am proposing to represent both sides in the same transaction. What about if, from time to time, I (or my firm) represent a particular VC fund and that is the fund that is proposing to invest in my client? Now we are getting closer to a conflict and the bar association may require (or may not) a waiver from both clients.

 

But all that is in the realm of technical conflicts. The real conflict is that the potential client is thinking, how good is the advice going to be if he has a relationship with the investor is he really in my corner? This is the rub of it. If the client can’t get comfortable with the relationship, then it is a problem and I am not going to get the engagement.

 

BTW, some clients like the idea that their lawyers represent their financing sources from time to time. They view it as a relationship enhancement. Something along the lines of they have connections and can help me get financing. And, to some extent, this is true.

In the end, you have to go with your gut on this one.

 

With respect to the second conflict, it is just not unusual for a large firm (or even a medium sized firm) to have multiple clients in the same space. This can lead to conflicts, as in the patent example above. Again, if you want a lawyer with knowledge of your industry, you may have to accept that he or she my have clients that are, or could become, your competitors.

 

I suppose there are some cases where the business conflict, or potential business conflict, is of such a nature that the firm really should not be representing both parties. The patent example above is the obvious case, but I am sure there are others.

 

Having said that, most business conflicts are not that direct. Is representing a company that does BI and one that does data storage a conflict? It could be, but how direct is the conflict. Should the founders of either company care? Need to know the particulars. 

 

There can be significant benefits to having a lawyer who knows your industry. It is a little bit like asking if you would take an investment from a VC who has other investments in related spaces. You can easily imagine the benefits: they know the industry, have good contacts that can be reached on your behalf, they are most likely to be interested in your company, etc. 

 

Analogous issues arise with lawyers, but in cases where there is not a direct irreconcilable conflict, you have to go with your gut. 

India Observations....When technology and norms collide.

Travelling by car in India in an unfamiliar city is often an interactive process very much along the lines of cluedo or a treasure hunt. Considering that most city streets run like a maze and the concept of a grid system is virtually non-existent the analogy is apt.

First, make sure you are in the city or at least close to it, (highway signs are pretty good about this).  Once you have determined that you are in fact in the city, pull over and flag down a passerby to help you with directions.  Extra points if the passerby is a local taxi or rickshaw driver.  Show them your address and they will point you not the address itself, but to a landmark in the general direction of the locality where the address is located, the methodology is always the same, once you get to a certain landmark, ask someone for the next set of directions...hence the hunt continues with the set of landmarks dwindling in importance as you get closer to your intended destination. As an old expert in this form of travel, I now remark with some surprise how the number of stops always seemed to be in the 4 - 7 range regardless of the complexity of the city I was visiting.  I say with some shame that my recent use of technology on a road trip was a direct assault on this generation’s old venerated form of transport.  How does this fit into entrepreneurship you ask? Read on…

Continue Reading

Valuation and Negotiation

 I was thinking about Rob Go’s post on valuation which makes one of those great points that fit in the category of common sense that people in my end of the business often feel intuitively but don’t articulate. With respect to the valuation of early stage VC investments (where there is no cash flow), he says:

The answer is that vc rounds are priced by the market - by supply and

demand. I once met an experienced VC who admitted to me that he didn’t

actually know how to do a DCF. But he did know where a deal would

likely close at based on pattern recognition.

From my point of view, since I am neither a buyer nor a seller of rounds, this is about as accurate a description of how pricing actually works as I have seen. For so many early stage technology companies there is no DCF analysis that can be done (or that isn’t transparently a work of fiction).

So, the discussion should really be about the kinds of things entrepreneurs can do to improve their negotiating position. There is a mountain of advice around the basic things entrepreneurs should do in preparing their slide deck, approaching VCs etc.   A personal favorite is Naval’s post on Presentation Hacks

I am not even going to try to list ten things that entrepreneurs can do to enhance their bargaining position, but I do want to talk about the imbalance of information between VCs and founders. VCs do lots of deals, they hang around with their partners who also do lots of deals, they sit on boards with other VCs who do lots of deals, they use lawyers who do lots of deals, they follow the venture industry (of which doing deals is a huge part) through conventions like the Nantucket Conference and publications like Dow Jones VentureSource.   They have a pretty good, albeit impressionistic, sense of what is going on in the market – way better than you do. 

This brings me to the “facts.” Entrepreneurs should get to know what is going on in the market. There are probably comps of some sort for any given company; find out about their valuation and terms. Some time ago, I wrote a post titled “Do the facts matter when you are negotiating with a VC over financing?” The thesis of this of this post was that it did not matter what was going on in the marketplace some entrepreneurs were going to get good deals and others not so good deals. 

Nivi did not agree and wrote the following comment:

This post seems to imply that BATNAs are the only leverage in negotiations. They're not. Having access to a database of deals and their terms is great normative leverage. Humans are susceptible to a host of psychological principles (consistency, reciprocity, etc.) and normative leverage exploits them.

So the non-rock star in this post can and should use norms to get a better deal.

Upon reflection, I agree with Nivi. Go find the facts. No real need to state the obvious, but what you negotiate in the A round is very important because, after the A round, founders only get diluted (in terms of percentage ownership) and (God forbid) if there is a down round founders can get washed out. 

Consider this: In connection with follow on rounds (B rounds and later) VCs are often (almost always) refreshing the option pool. Why? Because even they recognize that management (i.e. the people who will make it happen) have too small a stake in the business going forward. In effect, the investors have already taken the maximum percentage of equity they can out of the business. If you are a founder and no longer in management (for any reason) where are you going to be?

As another entrepreneur pointed out to me, from the founder’s perspective, small percentage differences at the front end can have large cash consequences at the exit. Now, let’s not lose sight of practical reality. Often, unless you are a rock star, you are going to have to take what you can get – that is to say there will be limits to your leverage and you don’t want to set an unconstructive tone with your potential investor (who, after all, is about to become your business partner and, probably, your biggest stockholder).

Another huge driver of negotiating leverage is the quality of the management team. Great sounding ideas are good, but there are quite a few of them out there. A management team led by someone who has delivered a nice exit in the past, is a rare thing that VCs (rightly) treasure.  Here is what Naval’s interview on a variety of topics related to entrepreneurship has to say on this point, and I think this is an exact quote, “It’s the people, stupid.”

Now, not everyone can get a rock star to lead their venture, if they could rock stars would not be so rare. But, a compelling team will make a significant difference to an investor. VCs will be skeptical about a first time entrepreneur’s ability to be CEO. If this is a role you insist upon, you may scare off a lot of investors. Where there are weaknesses in the management team, they need to be recognized and addressed in a sensible way. Demonstrating common sense and good judgment will help you in your negotiations.

Having said all this, you have to be realistic, you are not going to “win” every point, nor should you. Remember negotiation is a lot about what you get now, but it is also a lot about the relationship going forward.

If Rob go is right and I think he is, there are a lot of things out side of the usual slide deck, elevator pitch type advice that will affect your ability to obtain financing as well as the terms you get.  I will try to comment on them from time to time as I see them arise.

A great night at the MIT100K Finals...

Hats off to the organizers and the volunteers that helped put together the MIT 100K contest this year. It was evident at the finale that all of you had a great time pulling it together. 

For anyone that thinks otherwise: check these out:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHgV6F6zvsE

and the remix…… http://www.youtube.com/user/jarrodphipps#p/a/u/0/_S8cZHrSMHA.

 

Paul Fireman, the man who took Reebok  from a small family run business that made a couple of thousand shoes a year to the worldwide megabrand that eventually sold to Adidas for close to $3.8 Billion dollars in 2005 was the keynote speaker. He had some great advice for start-ups and entrepreneurs that had me scrambling for a memo pad. This might not be exactly what he said, but you get the idea…

 

“A business plan is a ticket, it gets you in the game, but by no means does it guarantee success in the game”

 

“Communication is the key; putting all that fancy and cool technology to the side, you have to be able to explain the need that your product fulfills and the market that it is directed at”

“Communication inside is just as important outside, you and your team have to make sure that you are all headed in the same direction”

 

“You have to believe you are doing something special…in our case it was making the greatest running shoe…ever”

 

Kudos to all the participants and special congratulations to all the finalists. I was hoping that a certain team would win (you know who you are) but I think the quality of all the final presentations and business plans was superb.

 

For me though, the show stealer was the team from Couchange.org, these guys get up on stage to receive the Twitch award, and in their 5 minute acceptance speech: tell everyone about how great their product is; put up $500 of their own money to match the first $500 donated and; challenge Paul Fireman..or as they called him “Mr Billionaire” to give to their good cause…..the sheer audacity, you got to love it!! 

 

Apparently Paul loved them just as much and the company raised $20,000 last night….is that a great 5 minute pitch or what! 

Top 12 Attributes that drive a premium valuation during exit...

 

Rick Briggs, Managing Director of Consilium Partners a Boston-based  investment investment bank that provides clients with buy-side and sell-side merger/acquisition and capital -raising services recently gave a talk at a Tech Talk Tuesday event hosted at our Emerging Enterprise Center and moderated by our very own David Pierson.

Rick focused mainly on the role of investment bankers through the exit process, the importance of planning for the exit and having competent and knowledgeable counsel through the exit process.  His slide on the top 12 attributes that drive a premium valuation for a company during exit really caught my eye and with his kind permission I share these with you...

Top Twelve Attributes Most Critical to Attaining a Premium Valuation For Your Company:

  1. Record of consistent revenue growth, with outlook for continued growth in the future
  2. Strong and improving margins (especially mature companies)
  3. Diverse customer base with absence of big concentrations
  4. Defensible industry niche(s)
  5. Continuous investment in R&D / new product development
  6. Complete and well functioning management team, with clear succession plan
  7. Ownership participation among members of mgmt team and key staff
  8. Rigorous internal financial controls; complemented by quality independent CPA
  9. Minimal ‘private company expenses’ and / or non-productive assets
  10. IP well documented
  11. Well-maintained facilities with up to date production equipment; legacy environmental or product warranty issues well addressed
  12. Corporate structure friendly to stock and asset buyers

To drive home the point, Rick's accompanying graphic below shows the surprising spread of valuation even among sophisticated institutional buyers.  If you want to see that magic offer on the far right (in terms of $$) or get the offer that has the most value for your company it makes sense to involve professionals early in your exit process.

Valuation Spread

 

VC seed money and monogamy

Venture Hacks has another contribution to the wide ranging discussion of taking seed money from VCs. As I worked my way back through the links to posts by Suster and Dixon and read through various comments from Fred Wilson, the concerns for the entrepreneur that come to the fore are (1) is the entrepreneur giving the VC a cheap option to the detriment of a good valuation later on and (2) is there negative signaling?

There are, of course, two sides (maybe more) to this argument. The VCs acknowledge the issues but argue that mostly they are “entrepreneur mythology.” Nivi (from Venture Hacks) takes the other point of view. 

We are all prisoners of our own experience. So here is what I have seen. First, I have never had a situation in which a name brand VC (Suster and Wilson certainly fit that description) seeded a client (usually with $250K and usually with a co-investor VC for another $250K for a total of $500K) and did not follow through with a Series A round. I have seen one situation in which the concept did not prove out and the entrepreneur (with the support of the VC) walked away from the business idea. But, I hasten to add, that in each instance in which I have represented entrepreneur getting VC seed money of this type, it has been an “A” list entrepreneur. (By “A” list, I mean someone who has previously started a funded company.) It may be that the bets are good bets, and for this reason the VCs exercise their options.

Since I have not seen the situation in which the VC does not take up the investment, signaling has not been an issue. But here is what I have seen. In several cases, I have noted that entrepreneurs are unhappy with their VCs. In these instances (and there are many more than most VCs would like to admit), the entrepreneurs have not gone back to their original funding sources to fund their second and third ventures. 

Suster suggests that this situation would be a negative signal about the entrepreneur or the new business, i.e. how does the entrepreneur explain that so and so did not invest in the new venture? I suggest that it may be just as bad (worse?) for the VC, who has to explain why an A list player did not go back to him to fund a business that other name brand VCs lined up to fund and in fact funded.

One final thought. I think the whole area is way over analyzed. Good teams with good business concepts tend to get funded (in a normal environment – whatever that may be). Good business concepts coupled with good execution, tend to succeed. Options and signaling are secondary issues. Getting funded once is not like getting married -- you do it once for life (actually getting married is not like getting married since about half of all marriages end in divorce). 

VCs make investments in different teams at different times for all sorts of reasons, and entrepreneurs seek investments from different VCs (and other sources) at different times for all sorts of reasons. Neither VCs nor entrepreneurs should attach too much value to monogamy.

Tenacity and Tea in India

Great blog entry on how two U.S educated professionals made in-roads into setting up their start-up in their homecountry - India.  I think it should make a great read for any aspiring entrepreneur or businessperson who sees an application and expansion of their business plan to a foreign country... http://blogs.wsj.com/india-chief-mentor/2010/03/02/be-tenacious-drink-the-tea/

My favourite part....

 "Did the leadership really not understand the tremendous potential of clean, distributed power to fuel sustainable development?” we marveled.  Later, we realized that they fully grasped the potential but also understood the time and effort it would take to create the government policy framework required to support such a program. "

Founder Agreements Redux

I wrote a second guest blog this one is about repurchase agreements and how to prepare for a parting of the ways for Sim Simeonov on the subject of founder agreements. This one is more . The prior one was on the subject of vesting. I have decided to repost it below.

Sim's introduction: Following my [Sim's] posts on improving the performance of founding teams, founder agreements and strategies for dealing with poorly performing co-founders, I continue to receive many emails at FastIgnite from entrepreneurs having difficulties with managing and formalizing the relationships with their co-founders. I reached out to my blogger friend Dave Broadwin, head of the Emerging Enterpise Center at Foley Hoag LLP, and invited him to provide his perspective in a series of guest posts of which this is the first. (No, it’s not legal advice.) I hope you enjoy them and follow Dave’s writing.

Founder Agreements: Vesting, vesting and more vesting.

Some time ago Sim Simeonov asked me to write a guest post on the subject of founder agreements.  For one reason or another it has taken a long time to get it done.  In part this is because I broke my leg skiing and in part it is because the number of founders walking through our doors these days seems to be on the rise.  So the very issues that Sim wanted me to write about have been taking up my time.

As Sim has pointed out in his two prior posts (Ten Rules for Better Founding Teams and Startup Founder Agreements), there are a lot of different types of contracts that founders have to enter into in the course of starting up a business.  Most of them, though, don’t give lawyers a lot of heartburn.  That is not to suggest that they are not important or that you should not pay attention to them, but from a lawyer’s point of view, there is not usually, a lot of controversy around NDAs and the like.  Having said that, Sim has mentioned that he routinely asks for changes in standard forms of NDA in the areas of information management, protection, destruction and return of information.  While it is true that most companies are very reluctant to make changes in employment related NDA (and other) forms which they ask all their employees to sign, it is also true that with the rise of the cloud and other factors, these forms may be at odds with the way information is actually handled.  If you have a legitimate point, most tech companies will hear it – so don’t be shy.

The shoals upon which founders founder, seems to me to be first and foremost, the allocation of equity among co-founders, and secondarily the use of equity to pay consultants and other people providing services in the early stages of the business.

I have said this elsewhere, but it almost seems like a rite of passage that founders give away too much equity to someone who later does not perform (and, often, who leaves the business to pursue some other job and wants to keep the equity).  Somehow you then have to get the toothpaste back in the tube.  This can be an ugly process.

Here is a very typical (perhaps I should say archetypal) fact pattern:  Sally wants to start a web based company.  She needs some coding done for her web page.  She meets Harry.  Harry is out of work (having been laid off from MondoHuge Software, Inc.).  Harry, who seems like a charming fellow, has the time and, apparently, the skills that Sally needs.  Moreover, Harry professes to have had his fill of big companies and is ready to launch an exciting new start-up.  So, for a mere 25% of the equity, Harry agrees to do all the coding and have the beta ready in six months.

Sally and Harry enter into an agreement (in the form of a letter that Sally sends to Harry without running it past her attorney, Clarence Darrow).  The letter says something to the effect of Harry will be in charge of software development and will be issued 25% of the common stock right away.  The letter says nothing about performance expectations or what happens if they are not met.  The performance expectations are all in Sally’s mind.  Sally never considers what might happen if Harry does not perform, let alone what might happen if he leaves the company.

Harry is issued a nice shiny new stock certificate.  Everything is cool for about two months.  Then Harry, who unbeknownst to Sally has been looking for a job all along, gets a job offer from Ginormous Software Corp.  He takes the job and tells Sally that he is moving to the west coast to run Ginormous’ new Flash division.

It turns out that Harry only wrote a few lines of code and is not planning to give back the stock, which he feels is his (since he is a co-founder).  Sally then calls Clarence ”How do I get the stock back?”  Although he uses other words, Clarence is thinking “I hope you are taking the little purple pill because heartburn is about to become a part of your life.”

Since an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, I am not going to write about how to negotiate with Harry under these conditions, rather I am going to write about the things you can do to avoid walking a mile (more like 40 miles) in Sally’s shoes.

To paraphrase the famous line from The Graduate “I have one word for you “vesting.’”

Sim has a lot of great things to say about vesting, but here is my take on it:

Every member of the team should be subject to vesting. Unless you are planning to go it alone, in which case who cares, every member of the team should be subject to some form of appropriate vesting.  Consider the divorce rate among practicing Catholics, and they are expecting to suffer eternal damnation if they break up.  Breaking up may be hard to do, but people do it a lot.  Like the Boy Scouts, Be Prepared, in case it happens to you.  If Sally had followed this policy, no matter how sure she thought she was about Harry, she would have been OK when he bolted.

Consider this, if Harry leaves with a big chunk of equity and won’t give all (or some) back, you are going to have to figure out how to dilute his position.  This means getting more stock into the hands of the remaining productive team members.  This topic is beyond the scope of this post, but you probably can’t just give everyone (other than Harry) a pile of new shares.  If you did, then everyone is likely to have phantom income equal to the value of the new pile of shares.  So, you have to consider options (which have other drawbacks).  You also have to consider the impact on your investors, if any, and what rights they have in connection with your issuance of shares and options.  Fixing the capitalization once the shares are issued and vested is hard to do.

Vesting should be part of an express agreement between the stockholder and the Company. No handshakes, vague understandings, or oblique references in emails, unless you plan to become part of AstraZeneca’s cash flow (they make the little purple pill).  Vesting can be made a part of a stockholder agreement signed by all stockholders.  One drawback of the collective approach is that it may be cumbersome or a diplomatic challenge to have different vesting schedules and arrangements for different stockholders.  Vesting can also be set forth (to use a lawyerly turn of phrase) in individual agreements.  This approach makes it easier to strike different deals with different people for whom different considerations might apply.  If Sally had a written agreement with Harry, she would not be looking for a scrip for the purple pill.

Immediate vesting is a bad idea.  By this I mean that all stock vests upon issuance.  The day after formation Harry gets to (a) keep all 25% and (b) leave for greener pastures.  Having said that, some level of immediate vesting is often appropriate.  For example, if the founders have been working part time for six months pulling the business together in their garage and they have real sweat in the business, a recognition of that contribution may be entirely appropriate.  This does not mean that everything should be fully vested right away.  Another common situation is when someone puts in actual money (in addition to sweat equity).  Stock that is bought and paid for probably should not be subject to vesting.

Time based vesting is often a good idea.  Time based vesting means that stock vests with the passage of time.  A very common scheme used in venture financed companies is four year vesting.  This typically has a one year cliff (after one year 25% is vested) and then three additional years during which stock (or options as is often the case in venture financed companies) vests ratable on a monthly or quarterly basis.  Companies that are not (or not yet) venture financed, often choose time based vesting in which stock vests ratable over three or four years beginning right away.  With this scheme, when Harry left to work for Ginormous, he would only have two months of vesting (way less than 25%).  One issue with time based vesting is that it does not take performance into account.  Often founders are reluctant to let people go, with the result that they time vest way longer than they should and they don’t deliver.

Milestone vesting is often a good idea.  With milestone vesting, stock vests upon achievement of stated milestones.  By way of example, 25% might vest upon shipment of beta with more vesting on final shipment and more on V2.0.  If Harry had agreed to milestone vesting, he would be leaving all his stock behind, which is probably the right outcome in the little morality play that this post is based upon.  One of the issues with milestone vesting is, of course, how clearly defined are the milestones.  If there is ambiguity around whether or not milestones have been reached then there can be disputes around that.  For example, if Harry is going to vest 25% on shipment of beta, maybe Harry will ship beta before it is really ready.  The only way to handle this issue that I have ever felt good about is to have very clear and unambiguous milestones.  The CEO of one of my clients has milestone vesting tied to specific revenue levels.  Now, you might think you either have the revenue or you don’t, but you can grow revenue by dropping price (and margin).  That is not what the board had in mind.  Now, in my client’s case it is working out because the CEO is not playing games, but not everyone could resist the temptation. Keep in mind, the company can play games too.  Unless you can find some measure that is truly clear and unambiguous, you reach a point where trust has to enter into the equation.  BTW, milestone vesting is also good for consultants and certain service providers.

Note that VCs usually insist on imposing vesting on founders in early stage investments (Series A).  Depending on a variety of factors a common approach is to let the founders have 25% to 50% fully vested and have the rest time vest over three years.  VCs see a lot more situations than you ever will.  There is a reason why they do this, even while they believe enough in the founder to invest millions.  Learn from them grasshopper.

Negotiation when you let someone go is the norm.  I have noted that often underperformers stay too long.  When you finally get around to terminating Harry, it could be before the cliff (assuming you have one) or after.  Particularly before the cliff (but it could be at any time) Harry is going to want to hang on to some options.  You should be aware that options are contracts, and like any contract, the option terms can be changed by agreement of the parties.  Option plans typically provide that an employee who is terminated, other than for cause, will have a period of time (usually 60 or 90 days) after termination to exercise vested options.  This means there must be some vested options and the employee has to be ready to stroke a check.  Sometimes neither is the case.  Rank and file employees typically have to live with the plan, whatever it says, but “senior” people often negotiate for some vesting and for a longer period of time to exercise.  I have not noticed that there is any standard length of time but perhaps a year is common for additional time to exercise.  Typically, the employee is looking for enough time for the company to reach some new valuation that will give the employee clarity as to the wisdom of exercising.  Also, with respect to the amount of vesting I have not noticed any “standards” – the senior employee gets what he or she negotiates.  My experience is that employees ask for the cliff (in a pre-cliff termination) and some portion of the remaining in a post-cliff termination.  Usually the company is willing to do something in a termination (other than for cause) and the negotiating space is not that great, so it is readily compromised.

Your board must approve option grants and changes to option terms.  This may be a technical point, but all option grants (including those promised to new employees when the come on board) and all changes to the terms of options (for example the negotiated changes that might happen on departure of a senior employee) must be approved by your board of directors.  The Delaware law reason for this is that you are, in effect, proposing to issue stock and that is the right of the board of directors.  For this reason, option grants in offer letters are often conditioned on board approval.  You must make sure you understand what your board will approve before you make offers.  Otherwise you could be embarrassed or worse.  From the employee’s perspective, you should get some assurance that the option grant will be considered by the board at its next meeting.  You might also want to get some assurance from whomever you are negotiating with that he or she has at least discussed the proposed grant with key board members and they are OK with it.

Once in a very dark blue moon, the bad thing happens: an employee or consultant is promised options subject to board approval and the board does not approve.  Consultants rarely protect themselves from this sort of thing.  I am not sure why – perhaps because they feel it is not diplomatic to suggest that they are not comfortable that the founder or CEO hiring them is not in sync with her board.  In any event, if you think you might find yourself in that position, you might suggest some alternative compensation that is not subject to board approval.  For example, in some cases CEOs have the authority to commit to signing bonuses.

As if that is not enough, investors (and this is absolutely true of VCs) negotiate for and obtain contractual restrictions on the issuance of options and the vesting and other terms upon which they can be issued.  Your grants must comply with your contractual agreements or you have to get a waiver from your investors.

The Internal Revenue Code will also have something to say about your grants.  I don’t want to go too far afield with tax stuff about qualified and nonqualified options, but I do want to note that Section 409(A) of the Internal Revenue Code has the practical effect of requiring that option grants be issued with an exercise price that is equal to or greater than fair market value on the date of grant.  If this stuff is of interest to you, check out Options and 409(A) – Sometimes the Law is an Ass.

Finally, and I hesitate to mention this because I am a lawyer and it will sound self-serving, but don’t be penny wise and pound foolish.  Consult with Clarence; have him review (preferably actually draft) the stockholder agreement.  It may be a sad life, but it is what he lives for.   In addition, he, like the VCs, sees a lot more deals than you ever will.

There are many other arrangements among founders having to do with stock and what happens if the founders come to a parting of the ways.  These include things like transfer restrictions, puts, calls, repurchase rights, mutual options and the various methods of valuation that go along with buying and selling stock.  These are beyond the scope of this post.  Also, they don’t typically apply to venture financed companies.  But, if there is sufficient indication of interest, I will write another post covering those items.

Thinking about selling securities? Consider this.

It seems like all of a sudden clients are asking questions about selling securities.  This could be one sign that the economy is picking up or it could be serendipity.  Either way, it seems to me that there are certain things entrepreneurs ought to understand about the regulatory structure when they are out raising money.  You don’t need (or want) to know what SEC lawyers know, but knowing the lay of the land is probably not a bad idea. 

So here is my attempt at giving you a basic sense of orientation in the world of securities laws.  [Here are the caveats:  This is not legal advice.  The descriptions below are way too big picture to substitute for discussing the particulars of your situation with a competent attorney.]

 

Where to begin?  Think about it this way:  In the mind of the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the entire universe of transactions in securities can be divided into two (well not quite – but OK for my purposes) categories:  First, transactions that are registered with the SEC (like initial public offerings a/k/a IPOs), and, second, transactions that are exempt from registration for one reason or another (like trades on the New York Stock Exchange or investments in technology companies by venture capital firms). 

 

With certain exceptions that I am not going into here, transactions in securities that are neither registered nor exempt from registration are illegal.  Bad things can happen if you engage in transactions that are neither registered nor exempt.

 

Now I am going to take a metaphorical step back and talk about “registered securities.”  Actually “registered securities” is a lay term that is confusing.  You don’t register securities with the SEC; you register “transactions” that involve securities.   You can also register “classes” of securities such as common stock.

 

So, under the Securities Act of 1933 you register “transactions” that involve securities.  An IPO would be a classic example of a transaction in securities that is registered under the Securities Act of 1933.  In essence, an IPO is the sale of securities by a company to the public (actually to an underwriter who in turn sells to the public, but that is a nuance).  Just to be clear, a sale of preferred stock to a VC is a transaction that involves securities.  It just happens to be exempt, as we will see later.

 

Under the Exchange Act of 1934, you register “classes” of securities.  For example, IBM has a class of securities (common stock) registered under the Exchange Act of 1934.  These shares are also listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange.  When you register a class of securities under the Exchange Act of 1934, you become required to make all those dreadful quarterly filings that public companies are always complaining about.

 

If you are a privately held company (meaning you don’t have a class of securities registered under the Exchange Act of 1934) looking for venture financing, you don’t, as a general matter, need to worry about the Exchange Act of 1934.  You don’t have a class of securities registered under that statute and you are not proposing to register one.

 

You do, however, need to worry about the Securities Act of 1933.  Why?  Because you are proposing to engage in a transaction involving securities and to be legal, such a transaction must either (1) be registered or (2) be exempt.

 

Before we dive into exempt transactions, which is what you really care about, a few (very few) words about registration.  It is expensive, really expensive, and time consuming, really time consuming.  A company going public could easily chalk up $750,000 in legal fees alone not to mention accounting fees and amounts paid to underwriters.  These types of transactions are the provenance of companies that are already public or are raising very large amounts of money.  Microcap public offerings do exist, but that is a story for another day.

 

So, at long last, exempt transactions.  There are lots of exempt transactions.  One example is trades on the New York Stock Exchange.  These transactions are exempt from registration under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 

 

Venture capital investments are also exempt.  These transactions are exempt because they are so-called private placements.  The “classic” form of private placement is exempt under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 – a limited offering, not involving a general solicitation of the public, to persons who are sophisticated buyers of this type of investment, and who are able to bear the risk of the complete loss of their investment (if it comes to that).

 

The issue with this type of exemption is determining where the line is between a private placement and a public offering.  Clearly, an IPO is a public offering.  The underwriters broadly solicit offers to buy and they sell to many thousands of people.  A placement of preferred stock to a couple or three venture funds (which is done with no publicity) is clearly a private placement.  But the issue is, where is the line?  What happens if there is an offering to, say, 100 people (or 1000)?  What if the investors are solicited through telemarketing or mass mailing?  What if the offering is made to all graduates of Harvard University?

 

Anyway, you get the point.  It is not always clear what is private and what is public.  In an effort to make the distinction clear, the SEC adopted something called Regulation D in the early 1980s.  Regulation D is a so-called safe harbor from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.  By safe harbor, the SEC means that if you comply with all the requirements of this regulation, your transaction will be deemed to be exempt from the registration requirements.  (In addition, compliance with Rule 506 of Regulation D limits the application of state securities laws in private placement transactions.  That’s really beyond what I am trying to cover here, but it turns out to be important.)

 

Regulation D has quite a number of requirements, some of them depend upon the amount raised and the nature of the offerees.  A detailed explanation of Regulation D is way beyond the scope of this post, so I want to focus on who can be an offeree, what disclosures must be made to offerees, how they can be solicited and the amount raised, but keep in mind that there are other requirements so you need to get advice around them.

 

Who can be an offeree?

 

Note that I am talking in terms of offers not purchases.  The safe harbor is structured in terms of the persons to whom you can make offers (not in terms of the persons who end up buying).  If you make offers to persons who are not appropriate offerees for your offering, even if only compliant persons end up buying, you have failed to comply with the requirements of Regulation D and the safe harbor is not available to you.  Note, you may (or may not, depending on the facts) have a good private placement (i.e. a transaction that is exempt from registration because it is a private placement) but you won’t have the certainty associated with meeting the requirements of the safe harbor.

 

So, assuming compliance with other requirements of Regulation D, including the requirement that there be no general solicitation, you can sell to an unlimited number of persons who are “accredited investors” and, again assuming compliance with other requirements, up to 35 (in some instances more, but these are for small offerings under $1,000,00 – more below under the discussion Section 504 of Regulation D) persons who are not accredited investors.

 

Here is a link to the definition of “accredited investor.”  I am not going to recreate the whole definition, but described below are the four categories of accredited investor that are most relevant to technology companies seeking angel or other private financing. 

 

·         corporations and certain other entities, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, with a net worth in excess of $5,000,000,

 

·         any director, officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offer or sold

 

·         any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000

 

·         any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 (or joint income with such person's spouse in excess of $300,000) in each of two most recent years and has a reasonable expectation of the reaching the same income level in the current year

 

In the mind of the SEC, people and entities that meet the definition of accredited investor, are able to fend for themselves and therefore, generally, require less protection through disclosure and other requirements than people who do not meet these requirements.

 

What disclosures must be made to offerees?

 

That last paragraph makes a nice segue into this section.  With respect to offers made solely to accredited investors, Regulation D does not impose any particular disclosure requirements.  (Please note, common law fraud applies.  If the offer is such that the disclosures amount to fraud the fact that the offer was made solely to accredited investors and was otherwise compliant with Regulation D, does not protect you from liability.)

 

But with respect to offers made to persons who are not accredited investors, Regulation D (with a modest exception) requires that extensive disclosures be made to all persons to whom securities are being offered.  So, if you include non-accredited investors in your offering, not only do you have to make extensive disclosures to them, but you have to make the same disclosures to all offerees.

 

The disclosures are extensive.  They basically track the requirements for a public offering.  Complying with these requirements is way too time consuming and expensive for most (but not all) early stage companies.

 

You may have run across formal offering memoranda prepared by investment bankers or brokers seeking to offer securities to individual investors.  These documents typically include many pages of descriptions of the company, its business, its management, its financial condition, the risks of investing, financial statements and the like.  These offering memos are often designed to comply with the disclosure requirements of Regulation D that are applicable to offers to not accredited investors.  There is a significant cost both in dollars and time associated with preparing these documents (often many tens of thousands of dollars). 

 

Now there are circumstances in which these types of offerings make a lot of sense, but for most technology companies seeking angel or VC funding, this is not a practical (or frankly in terms of the investor’s expectation sensible) way to go.

 

In order to minimize the time, cost and distraction of preparing the relevant disclosures, most attorneys will advise technology start-ups seeking angel or VC financing to exclude any non-accredited investors from the offering.

 

How may you solicit investors?

 

The big thing here is that you are not allowed to engage in “general solicitation” that is the hallmark of a public offering.  A public offering is made to the public.   A private placement is made privately to a select group.  In essence, you can only make offers (that comply with Reg D) to people with whom you have some connection and whom you have some reasonable basis think are accredited investors.

 

Here is a classic example of something you can’t do.  You can’t get a hold of the directory of alums of the Harvard Business School and mail your offering materials to them.  Why?  This amounts to an indiscriminate offer to a large number of people with whom you have no connection.  It is general solicitation.  You may think you have a reasonable basis to think they are all accredited and you may intend to sell only to those who later on establish that they are in fact accredited, but that is not enough.  If you engage in general solicitation, you are not engaged in a private placement and you must either register the transaction or find another exemption.

 

Here is another classic example of something you cannot do.  You cannot post on your web site that you are seeking investors for your new round of financing – not even if you also state that you will only accept accredited investors. Why?  This amounts to an indiscriminate offer to a large number of people with whom you have no connection.  It is general solicitation. If you engage in general solicitation, you are not engaged in a private placement and you must either register the transaction or find another exemption

 

What can you do?  Lots of stuff. 

 

You may approach individuals with whom you have a personal connection.  If you know Bill Gates, call him up. (Ditto your mother-in-law, if you dare.)

 

You may approach individuals to whom you are referred by your advisors (accountants, lawyers, bankers, etc.).  If your accountant says, “I know Bill Gates. Here is his cell number.  Give him a call and feel free to use my name.”  You can call up Bill.  This is true for angel investors generally.  If you are a client and I make an introduction, you can call.

 

You can approach organized angel groups.  This approach is typically done by contacting a member of the group who vets your business plan and then recommends you (or not) for a presentation to the group.  This is OK because you have established a connection to the group and it is not an indiscriminate offering to a large number of unknown persons.

 

You can approach venture funds.  They are accredited investors.  They hold themselves out as making investments.  Even if you mail to a lot of them, you are not making an indiscriminate mailing.

 

You can retain a “placement agent” (usually an investment banker or broker) who prepares a placement memo and sends it to persons with whom he or she has a connection.

 

How much can you raise?

 

Section 506 of Regulation D does not limit the amount that you can raise.  If you offer only to accredited investors (or if you meet the relevant disclosure requirements and make offers to 35 or fewer not accredited investors) and meet the other requirements of Regulation D (some of which I have described) you can raise any amount of money in a private placement thing to note here is that in a 506 offering non-accredited investors must demonstrate such knowledge and sophistication in financial and business matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment or the issuer must reasonably believe that immediately prior to the closing they meet this standard.  To meet this standard, issuers typically insist upon obtaining the certification of a financial advisor to the effect that the proposed investment has been appropriately explained to the not accredited investor.

 

Section 505 of Regulation D has somewhat less stringent requirements’ than Section 506 (that is when it comes to offers to not accredited investors), but it is only available for offerings of up to $5,000,000, less the aggregate offering price of all securities sold under Section 505 in the trailing 12 months.

 

Section 504 eliminates the limitation on the number of not accredited investors and the information disclosure requirements of applicable to 505 and 506, but it is only available for offerings of up to $1 million less the aggregate offering price of all securities sold under Section 504 in the trailing 12 months.

 

Although Regulation D is not the exclusive route to an exemption from registration for raising VC or angel money, it is a very popular route because of the certainty it provides around compliance with SEC rules.  If you are out raising money, you should have a basic understanding of the landscape.  Unfortunately, the securities laws are second only to the tax code in length, complexity and potential for mischief (by which I mean opportunities for entrepreneurs to mess up).  For this reason, you need competent advice when you are raising money.

May 2010 Issue

Quarterly Review of Venture Capital Financings: First Quarter 2010