Forms for angel and seed investments

Despite all the talk in the legal world about forms, and there is a lot of it, and despite the great success of the NVCA Series A documents project originally inspired by Sarah Reed, it took Fred Wilson’s recent blog post to create some interesting back and forth commentary on seed forms.

Good forms are a wonderful thing. They can save tons of time and cost – each of which is in short supply for early stage entrepreneurs. Now, not every shoe fits every foot, and sometimes work is needed and is appropriate.

At the risk of stating the obvious, if you are raising $400,000 (let alone a smaller amount) and you spend $20K on your counsel and $20K on investor’s counsel, you’ve blown 10% of your money right there. (Remember, you are also giving away a pile of equity to get that money in the door.) This is really expensive capital. Creativity and clever negotiating have a price.

Having said all that, I think it was T.S. Eliot who said with respect to literary criticism that "The only method is to be very intelligent." At some level, the same applies to your legal dealings. Forms are great, but they must be used thoughtfully.

Grand Visions and the VC Model

Having recently had a pretty bad skiing accident that required surgery and will require a long recovery (while chasing my son down the lift line at Ninety Nine 90 in the Canyons), I have not been able to write many posts, but now that I am past the initial stages of recovery, I have had some time to think about the tech world again.

Here is one of the somewhat intractable issues that have troubled me. I know, from internal research at our firm, that the average life of a venture financed client (from the time the company becomes a client until exit) is about 10 years. I also know from discussion with a VC friend that the average time to exit for companies in his portfolio is 8 years (at least that is what he is telling people). Remember, these are average numbers, so many investments take longer to get to exit. Also remember that our firm’s numbers reflect investments from a broad variety of VCs from the top tier to the little know funds. My friend is with a top tier firm, so their results may be somewhat better than those for the industry as a whole.

OK, so why waste time thinking about this number? Well, most funds have a ten year life. Ideally during that term, the fund is fully invested and fully liquidated. Most (all?) funds provide for extensions to liquidate laggard investments. Even still, limited partners in VC funds would like to get their return in ten years – that’s the plan.

If you know that your average time to exit is 10 years, then you know that investments made in years 3, 4, and 5 (let alone anything after that) are, on average, going to run way over. This accounts, in part, for the phenomena that many VC fundss will linger long after they are unable to raise new rounds.

But, it also may have an impact on investment style. Except in the earliest years of a fund, VCs will almost always be in the position of being under pressure to look for an exit. I am sure there are many ways in which VCs try to mitigate this pressure (doing follow on investments in new funds might be one, but that is a hassle for other reasons).

I suppose it is impossible to know how much pressure this situation exerts upon VCs to favor tightly defined business plans with a clear path to an exit over grander visions? I have commented elsewhere that VCs seem to me to favor narrowly focused tightly defined business plans that address clear pain points and have obvious exits. VCs also seem to me to have become very focused on domain expertise within their investment portfolios. This makes sense, why invest in something you don’t know about? But it also leads to a certain orthodoxy in the nature of investments.

In some sense the life of a normal fund is not suited to the life of a normal company. As a result, VCs are structurally driven to favor narrowly focused investments over grand visions.

Transaction Costs

My last post reminded me to come back to a theme that I address from time to time – transaction costs for small transactions. While it is true that smaller deals are not necessarily less complex than larger deals (sometimes it seems like just the opposite), you just can’t paper a $1,000,000 deal (let alone a smaller one) the way you can a $10,000,000. $40,000 is 4% of $1,000,000 – it might be a material item that eats into the money you have to put to work in your business in significant way. (By the way, I picked $40,000 randomly because it is not far off the cost of a typical Series A investment from a VC (that is the cost of one side’s lawyer).) But, there are risks in doing a less than thorough and careful job of documenting a transaction. I am sure there are many horror stories out there. Having said that, all businesses have to manage risk one way or another to preserve the value of the transaction. At the risk of stating the obvious, the best thing you can do is use an attorney experienced in representing early stage companies and hope the other side does too. The other thing you can do is be sensible about your own deal strategy – pick your battles. If you feel the need to negotiate every sentence of a document, guess what – your transaction costs will reflect that.

Seed and Angel Investor Notes

Seed and angel investments often come in the form of convertible notes – often notes that are convertible into some future round of equity investment at a discount to the valuation at the time of conversion. They have other terms as well such as interest rates, maturity dates, prepayment premiums in the event of an early sale of the business, waiver of certain debtor protections etc. These all may form the focus of future posts. I want to focus on what, if any, influence seed/angel investors who invest in these types of notes want (or get) concerning the terms of the equity into which they are planning to convert.

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The importance of being "accredited"

 

When start-ups raise money, the question inevitably comes up whether the proposed investor is “accredited” or not. One question is simply who is and who is not accredited. Another question is why should you care. 

To begin with the second question: The way the SEC regulates sales of securities is to begin with the principle that all transactions in securities must be registered with the SEC, unless there is a specified exemption from registration. (For those of you not familiar with registration, one example of it is the process that companies go through in their initial public offering. It can be expensive, time consuming and a real hassle, although there are streamlined versions of the process.) In any event, the SEC has exemptions for all sorts of transactions in securities, including trades on exchanges and the like. One exemption that the SEC has is for private transactions: so-called private placements. There are many forms of private placement, but almost all investments in venture financed companies fit this exemption. Having said that, if you make offers to too many people, its public – not private. If you advertise (maybe mail to the Harvard Business School class of 1999) it is public – not private. Anyway, you get the idea. It is not always clear what is qualifies a public and what qualifies as private. As a result of the ambiguities that have arisen in this area, the SEC adopted Regulation D.   Regulation D is a so-called safe harbor. It has a set of objective requirements. If your transaction meets these requirements, then it qualifies as an exempt private placement. 

Among the requirements of Regulation D is that if you make offers to sell securities to persons who are not accredited, you must make disclosures essentially equivalent to those made by public companies in their SEC filings. These requirements are onerous. They include delivery of all sorts of information that may not be readily available to a start up. In any event it will be expensive and time consuming to pull together. Not a desirable, or easy to meet, requirement for an early stage company. If you restrict your offers to “accredited investors”, as defined in the rule, the disclosure requirements are much much lower. As practical matter, the only applicable disclosure requirement is that you not commit fraud. The reason for this is that the SEC deems accredited investors to be able to fend for themselves. So, offerings that are restricted to accredited investors are faster, easier and cheaper. 

So, what is an accredited investor? It is someone (or some entity) that meets one of the criteria described below. Actually, there are other categories of accredited investor, but I have just listed the ones that apply to natural persons (lawyer speak for people). Needless to say, complexity can creep into the definition, so you must get professional advice to make sure you are compliant. But, below is the gist of it.

Accredited investor means any person who comes within any of the following categories:

Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000;

Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year;

Any trust, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase is directed by a sophisticated person as described in Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) and

Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors.

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Creative Capital

I ran into an entrepreneur that I know pretty well at a social gathering. As is often the case, the conversation turned to capital raising. It turns out that he has raised several hundred thousand dollars of "growth" capital through a loan from brokerage house. As I understand it the entrepreneur went to a number of wealth individuals and convinced them to open trading accounts at the brokerage house and use the securities in the account to collateralize/guarantee a loan to the entrepreneur’s company (in effect a margin loan with the proceeds being used to fund the business). In consideration of this loan, the company is doing two things: (1) it is paying the carrying cost (interest charged by the brokerage house) and (2) it issued some warrants to purchase common stock to the investors (the guarantors of the margin loan). As I understand it, the deal is that the loan will be repaid in one year. I also understand that the cost of capital is relatively low, although I don’t know all the numbers. Now, this particular company is really an execution play at this point in its life. It has real customers and now it needs to sell its product. It also has a robust pipeline of prospects. As a result, there is a credible basis for thinking that the carrying cost of the loan can be paid and that the loan can be paid in full in one year. Making this structure work for a pre-revenue company would take some changes, but it might be doable.

Angel Notes

As I have noted on many occasions, one of the most common structures for angel investments is a note that converts into shares of a future round at a discount to the price in that round. While this has the advantage, among other advantages, of putting off the moment when a valuation of the company must be agreed to, one client has recently pointed out the flip side to this benefit is that it caps the investor’s upside during the period from the angel investment to the moment of conversion into the future round at an amount equal to the relevant discount. While few angels ever worry about this issue, the point is well taken, especially if you believe that the future investor will require your angel investor to give up some (all?) of her discount in connection with the new round. One possible way to work around the issue of a capped upside is to issue low priced warrants to the angel investor. For some reason, venture investors have less of a tendency to bother with warrants than they do with discounted conversions. Needless to say, using warrants raises a lot of issues including how to price them both in terms of actual dollars and as a percentage of the equity of the company. They also introduce another piece of documentation and therefore complexity and expense, which may be OK or not OK depending in part on how much angel money you are raising.

If you can't get what you want at least get what you need

Sometimes you have to take your financing where you can find it and deal with the consequences later. If there were but world enough and time, you could negotiate the correct fair valuation for you business and the correct fair terms for you and the investors. But there never is (world enough and time) nor is this the best of all possible worlds. So, in the end you will have to settle, and, with luck, if you don’t get what you want at least you will get what you need. Along the lines of dealing with the real imperfect world, here are a few thoughts based on some client experiences.

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At least $250 million available for innovative broadband technologies and services to promote sustainable adoption

This could be the answer to a maiden’s prayers – if you happen to be a tech company developing an innovative use of broadband and you want free (non- dilutive) equity.  Buried deep in the bowels of the new stimulus law (a/k/a American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) is an allocation of at least $250 million for innovative uses of broadband for sustainable adoption.  The gist of it is as follows:

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The End of Doom and Gloom

EEC Perspectives - March 2009Below you'll find my article from the March '09 issue of EEC Perspectives, entitled The End of Gloom and Doom.

I like my gloom and doom as much as the next guy, but a whole year of unrelenting gloom and doom is overdoing it. Looking back on a year’s worth of numbers, it occurs to me that there is a lot to say that is not in the numbers.

Entrepreneurs are like weeds

If you just look at the national numbers you could come to the conclusion that there are fewer deals than last year, that the VCs are taking longer to invest and are investing at lower and lower valuations, and that all of this just acts as disincentive for entrepreneurs to start new ventures. But, anecdotal evidence is to the contrary. I polled some of my partners, and we all agree there is steady stream of new start-ups in all industries. They are not necessarily getting financing from VCs. In fact, the pattern that I see evolving is that entrepreneurs spend a bunch of time (many months) hiking up and down Winter Street to no avail. After that, they figure out other ways to keep moving forward by self-funding and going to family and friends or others with special affinity, and they make do with less. In a number of cases, they seem to me to be happier and more productive once they accept that there will be no VC money and they figure out something else. Entrepreneurs are like weeds; it will take more than a long dry spell to kill them off.

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What would you do?

I recently met with a potential new client. The two entrepreneurs have a great business concept, and some real “traction” (a word upon which I have commented before) in the form of actual repeatable sales. This is one of those good ideas that, once described, seems so simple and obvious that it makes you wonder why you didn’t think of it. The margins aren’t software margins, but they are close, and the addressable market is deep into the hundreds of millions. 

Like everyone else, they need money to support execution on the plan. They don’t need much: $1 million initially and perhaps another $3 or $4 million later on. They have many blue chip (read fortune 500 customers), and the business is potentially bankable. But, try to get money out of a bank these days. They are certainly going to try the banks, and I will point them in the direction of a couple of the usual suspects.

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NVCA Reports Venture Fundraising Down

A recent report released by the National Venture Capital Association and Thompson Reuters shows that the rate of venture fundraising continues to slow.

This statistic measures the amount of money raised by VC firms from their limited partner investors. The report states that 43 VC funds raised $3.4 billion in the Q4 2008. This is a steep decline from both Q3 2008, in which $8.4 billion was raised, as well as the fourth quarter of 2007, during which funds raised $11.7 billion.

For the full year in 2008, 211 VC funds raised a total of $28.0 billion, a 21.4% decrease in volume from 2007.

At first glance, this might not look too bad given the percentage losses and declines in valuation, in the economy generally and the tech sector. However, the drop in Q4 is so drastic that if it proves a sign of things to come, it could signal a real tightening of VC funds available to venture-backed companies and those seeking their first venture investment.

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EEC Perspectives -- January 2009 Issue

We present with pleasure the next issue of EEC Perspectives, our periodic look at venture activity in the New England region. With this issue we are back to Series A transactions, featuring those closing during the third quarter of 2008. (Prior issues of EEC Perspectives, which alternate between Series A and later rounds, can be found in the News and Publications section of  the EEC website.)

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2009 Venture Funding Outlook

Yesterday I moderated a panel on the subject of the venture investment climate in 2009. The panelists were Axel Bichara of Atlas Venture and Austin Westerling of Charles River Ventures. The big picture take away from this event was that the investment climate is not as bad as advertised in the press.  In each case, Atlas and CRV have made a number of investments in the last year and continue to be actively looking for new investments. If I can generalize, their advice was (1) be prepared for a thorough diligence and, perhaps, a longer than normal process and (2) be realistic about valuations.

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NEW EEC PERSPECTIVES NOW AVAILABLE

EEC Perspectives October 2008
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I am pleased to announce that the next issue of EEC Perspectives is now available.   Each issue of EEC Perspectives presents quarterly data and analysis on the number and size of transactions in the New England region and, with respect to numbers of transactions, nationally, and provides analysis on certain key terms of the New England transactions. We have been publishing EEC Perspectives since last May, alternately focusing on early rounds and later rounds. (Prior issues of EEC Perspectives can be found in the News and Publications section of  the EEC website.)  The current issue is the second to focus on Series B and later rounds.   It includes a market perspective from entrepreneur and investor Vinit Nijhawan.  Among other things, Vinit has some helpful suggestions about steps you can take to help yourself prepare for a later stage round in today's circumstances.  The issue also contains commentary from Foley Hoag lawyers Amanda Vendig, Jerry O'Connor and me, including perspectives on the current investment environment.  You can find other comments about the impact of the current economic situation in my recent blog about the current venture capital outlook and other blogs below, such as Dave Broadwin's recent entry regarding terms in down times

More on Funding and M&A and IPO Exits

With reference to IPOs and exits, TechCrunch had the following to say: 

So far the downward spiral of credit and financial markets seems to have left venture capital firms and startups relatively unharmed. Even though the IPO market closed completely in the second quarter (and opened again only slightly in the third), venture capital firms continue to raise money and invest in startups at a healthy pace. During the first half of the year, venture capital firms raised about $16 billion in 141 funds and invested about $15 billion in nearly 2,000 deals.

and this:

On top of that, the exit environment for existing startups is not looking any better. A new MoneyTree report by PricewaterhouseCoopers that is out today notes that both the number of IPOs and M&A exits for startups declined precipitously:

While I agree completely with the conclusions on the number of M&A and IPO exits, our research is not consistent with what TechCrunch (and PWC/MoneyTree -- which is where TechCrunch gets its data) has to say about the pace of investment in startups. 

A more focused look at numbers shows a different picture. Based upon searches of the Dow Jones VentureSource focused on Series A financings and Series B and later round financings in New England and the country as a whole, there appears to be a decline in venture investing in 2008 compared to 2007 (see EEC Perspectives).

Venture Capital Outlook

There has been a lot of interest recently in the level of venture capital investment activity that can be expected over the near term in light of the recent meltdown in the credit and capital markets. Through the third quarter of 2008, investment activity seems to have held up pretty well, but what will the future bring? I’m no fortune-teller, but based on what I’ve been seeing and hearing, I can hazard a few educated guesses:

  • There will be a slowdown in activity as investors wait for the economic picture to stabilize.
  • Seed rounds and Series A rounds will continue to get done for promising companies, but at reduced valuations and with more onerous terms.
  • Follow on rounds will become harder to do, and will more often be internally led.
  • Down rounds will become more prevalent.
  • Bridge financings will serve as the finger in the dike until denial progresses to acceptance.

One potentially positive note for emerging companies that may arise out of the current economic situation:  engineering and other technical talent may become easier to find and less costly to recruit.

Funding and Exits

Anecdotal evidence indicates that in the current environment there are a lot of "extension" rounds or bridges from existing investors.  The obvious reason for this situtuation is that it is hard to attract Series B and later round money in a climate where there is as much uncertainty as there is right now.  By extension rounds, I mean selling additional shares of the previous round at the same valuation as the previous round to the same players.  I suspect our research  will show that Series B and later round activity in the second quarter was basically flat.  We wont be able to get numbers for Q3 until near the end of November, but, anecdotal evidence indicates a decline in activity.  Clearly a resolution of the current crisis in the financial markets can only help, but  an improvement in the long term outlook for exits (both IPOs and M$A transactions) is what is needed to turn the investment tide.

Pre-Money Valuation and Other Economic Terms (Part 1)

Many entrepreneurs focus on pre-money valuation to the detriment of other economic terms that can be equally significant in a venture financing.  As you may have heard venture investors or others say before, "I'll let you pick the valuation as long as I get to pick all the other terms." This is because beyond the pre-money valuation, there are an infinite number of ways through other economic terms for the investors to extract their returns.

The pre-money valuation is used to determine the price per share that your investors will pay, but the idea that it is actually the valuation of the company instead of simply the customary method of determining a price per share in a financing is somewhat of a misnomer. A pre-money valuation of $5 million for a typical Series A deal on a $5 million venture investment really just means that the venture investor will be getting a 50% equity stake for the upside portion of its investment (after all the preferred terms have kicked in). For the company to really be worth $5 million pre-money in that scenario, the investor would be getting the exact same type of security (common stock) as what is already outstanding. The fact that your venture investors give you a pre-money valuation of $5 million certainly does not mean that you could sell the company for $5 million instead. In fact, as the 409A valuation models will show you, the common stock in such a situation is often valued at approximately 10-20% of the preferred. So the "real" pre-money value of the company in this scenario (at least in an "appraised value" sense) may be more like $500k to $1m.  Add to that the fact that the unallocated option pool will generally be 10-20% and come out of the pre-money valuation and you can see that the "real" valuation could be as low as even $300k in our scenario (applying a 10% common to preferred valuation and a 20% option pool).

Other key economic terms entrepreneurs should be looking at in addition to the pre-money value include:

  • Does the preferred have a participation feature? If so, is it capped?
  • What is the liquidation preference? Is it more than 1x? 
  • What is the option pool and is it taken out of the pre-money valuation?
  • What is the dividend rate and do they accrue and add to the liquidation preference?

Here are two scenarios that illustrate some of these terms. Scenario B has the higher pre-money valuation, but its pretty clear it is the less attractive offer to a startup.

Scenario A:
$5 million Series A investment
$5 million pre-money valuation
10% unallocated option pool (dilutive to pre-money)
1x liquidation preference
Non-participating preferred
No accruing dividends

Scenario B:
$5 million Series A investment
$6 million pre-money valuation
20% unallocated option pool (dilutive to pre-money)
1x liquidation preference
Participating preferred
10% accruing dividend added to liquidation preference

Right off the bat, the difference in the option pools means that the investors in Scenario B will actually pay a lower price per share and receive a larger piece of equity. In Scenario A, $1m of the combined $10m valuation is set aside for the unallocated option pool, leaving $4 million of the pre-money value for the outstanding equity of the company. In Scenario B, even though the higher pre-money valuation means a combined valuation of $11 million, $2.4 million is for the unallocated option pool, leaving $3.6 million for the outstanding equity of the company. So right off the bat, despite the higher pre-money valuation, the existing equity is 10% worse position. In our scenarios, even if all terms but the pre-money valuation and option percentage were the same, it would take a pre-money valuation of $6.667 million for the point at which Scenario B with a 20% option pool is economically equivalent to Scenario A with a 10% option pool.

I'll cover some of the other key economic terms and differences between Scenarios A and B above in future posts.

Further to Money on the Sidelines

According to the NVCA approximately $36 billion has been raised by venture funds in 2007 (see my blog titled Money on the Sidelines).  This is a really big number, and I am not sure what is included. 

Research into DowJones VentureSource indicates that (according to their methodology) the following is the money raised by VC funds in the last ten years. 

  Investors Funds Total Raised (MM)
1998 175 194 $23,828.64
1999 290 334 $54,156.31
2000 404 437 $78,353.32
2001 230 247 $47,167.32
2002 107 111 $12,368.85
2003 63 65 $7,547.95
2004 96 104 $16,779.37
2005 107 112 $23,113.81
2006 85 86 $24,811.91
2007 35 35 $7,414.60

Any way you look at it a lot of money was raised in since 2003, and some of it is getting old.  Without having an accurate fix on how much has been invested, it is impossible to know what is on the sidelines.

Congratulations to Viridity Software

Congratulations to our client Viridity Software, Inc. which recently close its Series A financing from Battery Ventures and Northbridge Venture Partners.

Congratulations to Advanced Electron Beams

AEBCongratulations to our client Advanced Electron Beams, Inc. which recently completed a financing led by GE Energy Financial Services, a unit of GE (NYSE: GE).

Due Diligence from the VC Side

One of my themes has been how to deal with VCs.  In particular, I have focused on making pitches, but, obviously, the process of getting funded involves a lot more than that, and the beginning of the process is the due diligence that a VC undertakes when making an investment decision.  Here is a really good blog entry from Jeff Bussgang posted on Always On's blog.  It is definitely worth a read.

New Report on 2008 Second Quarter Series A Transactions in New England

EEC Perspectives October 2008The EEC's analysis of Series A transactions in New England for Q2 just came out.  It shows what is shows -- that there has been a decline in Series A deals compared to the same period in 2007.  As I look at our publication (which covers data through June -- three months ago), I have to note that so much changed so dramatically in Q3 that Q2 seems like it was thirty months ago.  We are in the process of finalizing our data for Q2 Series B and later stage financings and expect it to come out in the next couple or three weeks.  I have a sinking feeling that it also will feel like history rather than current events.  We have begun to gather the Q3 data but wont really know the numbers until well into November.  Stay tuned.  My sense is that (1) the number of Series A deals will continue to fall and (2) that we may start to see terms becoming more investor friendly, but don't hold me to it.

Congratulations to Vanu

Congratulations to our client Vanu, Inc., which recently announced the closing of a $32 million venture round led by Norwest Venture Partners.